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COMMENT
CAN YOUR EYES BE USED AGAINST
YOU? THE USE OF THE HORIZONTAL
GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST IN THE
COURTROOM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") developed a battery of tests which it considers "the
most effective procedure[s] for testing drivers at roadside to deter-
mine whether or not they are intoxicated."' 2 These roadside sobri-
ety tests are designed to gauge inebriation by evaluating a person's
coordination, balance, and mental agility.3 Unlike chemical testsju-
rors need only apply their common-sense knowledge of the world to
appreciate the results of these "psychophysical" coordination tests.
However, these tests also convey the "imprimatur of science," effec-
tively making them difficult to repudiate.4
Horizontal gaze nystagmus ("HGN") is one such roadside so-
briety test. This test is premised on the fact that the automatic
tracking mechanisms of the eyes are affected by alcohol. 5 Nystag-
mus is defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball,
* The author wishes to thank Professor Robert P. Bums and Associate Dean J.
William Elwin Jr. for their thoughtful insight and advice.
I The NHTSA recommends that an officer administer the walk-and-turn test, the
one-leg stand test, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. John Seelmeyer, Nystagmus, A
Valid DUI Test, LAW & ORD., July 1985, at 29.
2 2 DONALD H. NICHOLS, DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION § 26:01, at 1 (1990).
3 Richard J. Essen & Marla Levenstein, Roadside Sobriety Tests: Both "Scientific" and
Unreliable, DWI J., Nov. 1989, at 6.
4 Id. at 5. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (because scientific techniques appear objective, opinions that
claim scientific bases are "apt to carry undue weight with the trier of fact") (cited in
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2 (3d ed. 1991).
5 Edward B. Tenney, II, The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test and the Admissibility of Scien-
tific Evidence, 27 N.H. BJ. 179, 180 (1986). See, e.g., NHTSA DOT HS-805-864, DEVEL-
OPMENTS AND FIELD TEST OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL TESTS FOR DWI ARREST App. A (1981).
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which may be horizontal, vertical, rotatory, or mixed." 6 It occurs
naturally as one's eyes focus on all objects within their field of vi-
sion. In order to give the impression of imagery in motion, the eyes
focus on each and every object individually and then track the se-
quence of objects at a high rate of speed. 7 As a result, many people
will show horizontal nystagmus as their eyes track objects to the ex-
treme sides.8 Alcohol slows down the eyes' ability to rapidly track
objects and causes the eyes to oscillate, or "jerk," before they nor-
mally would in a sober person.9 Nystagmus is more easily detecta-
ble in an intoxicated person because alcohol stimulates the nerve
endings, thus making nystagmus more pronounced. 10 The HGN
test purports to gauge intoxication by measuring this involuntary
oscillation of the eyes. I
Several jurisdictions 12 use the results of roadside sobriety tests
in the prosecution of "driving under the influence" ("DUI") cases. 13
Yet some critics question the use of the HGN test as scientific evi-
dence in the courtroom. 14 Mostjudges and juries readily accept the
walk-and-turn' 5 and the one-leg stand' 6 because they "know" that
6 State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992) (quoting DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1068 (25th ed. 1974)).
7 Tenney, supra note 5, at 180.
8 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, IMPROVED SOBRIETY TESTING 1 (1984).
9 Id. at 1.
10 Tenney, supra note 5, at 180.
11 Gayle Tronvig Carper & William McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus: Scientific Proof of DUI?,
77 ILL. B.J. 146, 147 (1988).
12 States that have rendered opinions on the HGN test include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
13 The most common legal criterion for "under the influence" has been defined as
relating to the "impairment of senses, judgment, and motor skills that makes driving
after drinking alcohol dangerous." Jonathan D. Cowan & Susannah G. Jaffee, Proof and
Disproof of Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Through Evidence of Observable Intoxication and
Coordinating Testing, 9 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 459, 474 (1989).
Most states have either a "presumptive" or an "illegal per se" limit for DUI of
0. 10%. NHTSA DOT HS-807-186, DWI DETECTION AND DIVIDED ATTENTION FIELD SO-
BRIETY TESTING; A SELF INSTRUCTIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OF-
FICERS 19 (1987). A presumption of alcoholic influence means that it is presumed that
the person is under the influence if he has a BAC of 0.10% or more. Id. at 45. Illegal
per se is conclusive. Operating a motor vehicle with a BAC level of 0.10% or more is
an offense in and of itself." Id. at 48.
14 See, e.g., Mark A. Rouleau, Unreliability of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 439, 462 (1989).
15 A subject assumes a heel-to-toe stance on a designated line with his arms at his
sides. The subject then takes heel-to-toe steps on the line, then turns around while
keeping one foot on the line, and returns in the same heel-to-toe step. NHTSA DOT
HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 5.
16 The subject stands with his heels together, arms at sides, and raises one leg about
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excessive alcohol in the blood can cause balance problems. 17 On
the other hand, the general public knows little about horizontal gaze
nystagmus. Although scientifically well-documented, few persons
have ever observed the eye movement of others who have elevated
blood alcohol concentrations ("BAG"). I8
To overcome this problem, the NHTSA has provided manuals
to establish experimental validity.19 According to the NHTSA, the
greatest advantage of the HGN test is that a trained observer can
accurately determine whether the blood alcohol content level of a
test subject is above or below 0.10%20 merely by administering the
test.2 1 Some experts, however, question the use of the HGN test.2 2
Critics of the HGN test argue that, while it does have some merit,
the test is not conclusive, 23 and, although based on scientific princi-
ples, it is unreliable.
24
This comment will address the use of horizontal gaze nystag-
mus as scientific evidence in the courtroom. Section II focuses on
HGN as a technique for detecting intoxication and discusses the
procedure adopted by the NHTSA for law enforcement use. This
six inches off the ground. He then must hold his leg in this position and count rapidly
from 1001 to 1030. Id. at 7.
17 Eric Halperin & Robert L. Yolton, Is the Driver Drunk? Ocularmotor Sobriety Testing, 57
J. Am. OPTOMETRIC Ass'N 654, 657 (1986). The authors suggest that such knowledge
possibly derives from personal experience but they make no general statement about the
actual weight that juries give to these tests once admitted as evidence.
However, the results of a 1974 survey of 1363 judges and lawyers in the United
States reported that 75% of those surveyed believed that judges accorded scientific evi-
dence greater weight than other evidence, and 70% believed that juries found scientific
evidence more credible. Another survey involving jurors indicated that scientific evi-
dence was the decisive factor in guilty verdicts for about 25%o of those who served on
juries. Paul C. Giannelli, Lecture at the Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lec-
ture on Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions (Mar. 26, 1992), in 137 MILWAUKEE
L. REv. 167, 173 (1992).
18 Halperin & Yolton, supra note 17, at 657.
19 According to the 1981 NHTSA manual, "validity refers to the degree to which a
test measures what it is designed to measure, which in the case of field sobriety tests, is
the impairment produced by alcohol." NHTSA DOT HS-805-864, supra note 5, at 19.
20 Although the "legal limit" of BAC varies from state to state, the majority of states
have adopted 0.10%o as the legal limit of intoxication. Halperin & Yolton, supra note 17,
at 654.
21 2 NicHoLs, supra note 2, at 1; see, e.g., NHTSA DOT HS-802-424, PSYCHOPHYSICAL
TESTS FOR DWI ARREST (1977).
22 See, e.g., Halperin & Yolton, supra note 17, at 657.
23 See James J. Ahern, Handling DUI Cases, in DEFENDING DUI AND RELATED CASES
§ 1.160 (Il1. Inst. for CLE ed., 1991).
24 See Rouleau, supra note 14, at 452. Validity and reliability are not synonymous.
"Validity" refers to the test's accuracy, and "reliability" refers to its consistency. For a
test to be valid, it must also be reliable. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIETInrlc EVIDENCE § 1-1, at 1 n.1 (1986);JoHN A. TARANTINO, STRATEGIC USE OF SCI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.03 (1988).
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section will also briefly address views expressed by proponents and
opponents of HGN testing. Section III discusses the standards by
which scientific evidence is admitted into evidence in the courtroom,
specifically analyzing the recently established Daubert2 5 relevancy
approach, as well as the more traditional Frye standard of "general
acceptance." 26
The next sections examine case law to consider how HGN test-
ing has been accepted in various courts of law. Specifically, Section
IV discusses State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Cochise (Blake).
27
This case has been relied on by almost every subsequent case, and is
considered one of the most thoroughly researched and well-rea-
soned cases dealing with the issue of admissibility of the HGN test.2 8
Section V examines and distinguishes the case law since State v. Supe-
rior Court. This section will comment on the strengths and weak-
nesses of various alternatives adopted by the courts, and will look at
a direction that the courts may turn to in the future. Section VI
suggests that courts devise a jury instruction that not only reflects
the best aspects of the HGN test, but also mentions the test's limits,
difficulties, and circumstances for unreliability. This comment con-
cludes that despite its faults, the HGN test should be admitted at
trial as reliable evidence.
II. HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS
Nystagmus is a well-known physiological phenomenon 29 involv-
ing rapid involuntary oscillation of the eyes. 30 Gaze nystagmus, or
"jerk nystagmus," is characterized by a slow drift of the eyeball,
"usually away from the direction of gaze, followed by a quick jerk or
recovery in the direction of gaze."'' s Using an imprecise definition
such as "jerking of the eyes," however, can lead to confusion. 3
2
Nystagmus is the slow drift of the eyeball toward the nose; a saccade
is the quick corrective movement which returns the eyeball to the
25 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
26 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Daubert court ex-
pressly rejected the Frye standard. Thus, in federal courtrooms, Frye no longer applies.
Many states, however, still apply the Frye test. It remains to be seem whether these
courts will eventually adopt the Daubert analysis or stay with Frye.
27 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986).
28 See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 885 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
29 State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 177.
30 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 1.
31 THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1980 (14th ed. 1982) [hereinafter
MERCK MANUAL].
32 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2 at 4; William A. Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Xvstagnius: I'oo-
doo Science, DWIJ., Mar. 1987, at 2.
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lateral position.3 3 A layperson could conceivably mistake a saccade
for nystagmus.
34
Research has shown that acute alcohol intoxication causes gross
motor defects such as sluggish physical response, poor coordina-
tion, emotional instability, and behavior changes.35 Further studies
have shown that eye movement3 6 is also affected by alcohol intoxica-
tion.3 7 Relying on these connections, and finding that excessive al-
cohol will affect driving skills, the NHTSA devised its field sobriety
tests.3
8
The NHTSA's 1977 report3 9 evaluated six roadside tests and
found that not only are signs of alcohol intoxication in the eyes eas-
ily assessed by visual observation, but that among the psychophysi-
cal roadside tests, the eyes afford the most sensitive means for
assessing whether a driver is legally intoxicated.40 In 1984, the
NHTSA published a highly-anticipated manual for the purpose of
teaching police officers the most effective means of testing roadside
intoxication.4 1 The NHTSA claimed that proper execution of the
walk-and-turn, one-leg stand, and HGN tests could determine blood
alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more at roadside.4 2
The NHTSA's proposed HGN test requires that the administer-
ing officer stand directly in front of his subject.43 The suspect
stands at attention, keeping his feet together and his arms by his
sides.44 The officer gives the test outside the vehicle in a well-
lighted area.45 The driver's glasses are removed,46 and the test is
33 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 4.
34 Id.
35 See Gregory W. Good & Arol R. Augsburger, Use of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus as a
Part of Roadside Sobriety Testing, 63 AM. J. OPTOMETRY & PHYSIOLOGICAL OpTIcs 467
(1986).
36 Smooth pursuits are normal eye movements. Improper eye tracking includes posi-
tional and gaze nystagmus, saccades, and caloric eye tracking patterns. Id. See also
Yoshio Umeda & Eiji Sakata, Alcohol and the Oculomotor System, 87 ANNALS OTOLOGY, RHI-
NOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY 392 (1978) (recording effects of alcohol on all eye movements).
37 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 467.
38 Essen & Levenstein, supra note 3, at 6.
39 NHTSA DOT HS-802-424, supra note 21.
40 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 468.
41 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 1.
42 The manual recommends monthly precision checks so that officers sustain their
accuracy in gauging intoxication and also warns that improper use of the test will render
results inaccurate. Id. at 1-2.
43 Dennis Lusk, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 27, 28 (1988).
44 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 469.
45 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 1.
46 Paul S. Helzer, Detecting DUIs Through the Use of Aystagmus, LAw & ORD., Oct. 1984,
at 93. Glasses are removed because they may block the officer's view of the suspect's
eyes. NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 4.
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not administered if the suspect is wearing hard contact lenses for
fear of dislodging a lens47 or hindering eye movement. 48 Holding a
pen or finger twelve to fifteen inches away from the subject's face,
just above eye level, the officer instructs the suspect to cover one
eye and, with the open eye, follow the pen (or finger) while keeping
the head stationary.
49
Using this method, the NHTSA found a strong correlation be-
tween the angle at which the onset of gaze nystagmus is first de-
tected, and the blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") of the
subject. 50 Thus, a person's BAC level may be estimated with the
following equation: Angle of onset of gaze nystagmus = 51 o - (105) (per-
cent BAC).5 t If HGN is observed at an angle of forty-five degrees
from the subject's nose,52 the equation yields a BAC of 0.10%. The
NHTSA claims that officers who use this equation and follow the
proper HGN test procedures can accurately classify the subject as
having a BAC of at least 0.10% in 78 out of 100 cases.
53
In addition to using the equation to estimate BAC, the NHTSA
manual instructs officers to look for three signs of intoxication in
each eye.54 These signs are: (1) onset of alcohol gaze nystagmus in
right eye occurs before forty-five degrees; (2) nystagmus in the right
eye, when moved as far as possible to the right, is moderate or dis-
tinct; (3) right eye cannot follow a moving object smoothly; (4) on-
set of alcohol gaze nystagmus in left eye occurs before forty-five
degrees; (5) nystagmus in the left eye, when moved as far as possible
to the left, is moderate or distinct; (6) left eye cannot follow a mov-
ing object smoothly.55 The officer administering the test gives one
point for each sign of intoxication for a maximum (failing) score of
six points. If the suspect scores four or more points, his BAC is
classified as 0.10% or higher.
56
The NHTSA's study has received both praise and criticism.
Proponents of HGN testing favor it because an experienced
drinker 57 could have a BAC of 0.13% or 0.14% and still pass the
47 Halperin & Yolton, supra note 17, at 655.
48 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 4.
49 See Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 469.
50 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 2.
51 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 468.
52 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 2.
53 See Pangman, supra note 32, at 2.
54 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 469.
55 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 4.
56 Id.
57 Just as individuals differ greatly in their abilities, talents, and appearances when
sober, their coordination and abilities also differ when affected by alcohol. While alco-
hol may impair one person, the same dosage may not only relax another, but may actu-
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traditional field tests, thus evading arrest.58 In contrast, a person
cannot voluntarily control HGN, and an officer properly trained in
the use of the test can get a more accurate indication of the individ-
ual's level of intoxication.59 In fact, some proponents claim that a
driver's BAC level can be accurately estimated within 0.02% by an
officer who is properly trained in HGN testing procedures.60 More-
over, supporters of HGN testing argue that it violates no constitu-
tional right.61 Finally, officers favor it because a defendant's
attorney cannot complain of language problems6 2 arising during the
test.6 3
The HGN test is also reported to be the most accurate of the
roadside sobriety tests. When an officer "grades" a suspect accord-
ing to the aforementioned six point scale, the officer's accuracy rate
is reported to be seventy-seven percent. 64 The walk-and-turn test65
ally improve his test scores. Such a variation among individuals is further compounded
by the fact that officers usually do not have "sober coordination" scores to use as com-
parisons. Cowan &Jaffee, supra note 13, at 472-73.
58 See State v. Superior Court ix rel. County of Cochise (Blake II), 718 P.2d 189, 192
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). This is germane to those jurisdictions that define DUI according
to a specific BAG level of 0.10%. States affected include Arizona, Kansas, and Ohio.
59 Id.
60 Ahern, supra note 23, at § 1.160; Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 468.
61 Carper & McCamey, supra note 11, at 149. Sobriety testing is neither interrogation
nor testimonial evidence and is therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment. Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). See, e.g., State v. Superior Court (Spears), 742
P.2d 286 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Lowe, 687 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1984); Wahpeton v.
Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1980) (finding that roadside sobriety tests are not com-
municative, but rather real or physical evidence, and do not warrant constitutional pro-
tection against self-incrimination).
The United States Supreme Court has also held that roadside sobriety checkpoints
and searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); State v. Superior Court ex rel. Cochise (Spears), 742 P.2d
286 (Ariz. 1987); State v. Harrison, 618 A.2d 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Law-
rence, 843 P.2d 488 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
62 For other roadside sobriety tests, a driver must pay close attention to a series of
instructions in order to accurately perform the physical tests. See supra notes 15-16. In
contrast, for the HGN test, the driver need only follow one instruction-look straight
ahead and follow the police officer's pen or finger. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
63 Boris Yaro, His Frustrations Led Him to Help Develop a Standardized Field Sobriety Test,
Sgt. Studdard: A Fight Against Drunk Drivers, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1985, at 12.
64 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 1; Good & Augsburger, supra note 35,
at 468. These figures were determined to be accurate because the test subjects were
dosed to specific BAC levels between 0.10% and 0.19% and then the police officers'
scores were compared to the actual BAG levels. NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note
8, at 1.
As for the field tests, roadside tests were compared to actual BAC levels, which were
obtained through breath analyses once an arrest was made. Good & Augsburger, supra
note 35, at 470.
65 The walk-and-turn is graded on a nine-point scale. Grading is as follows:
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provides a correct diagnosis sixty-eight percent of the time, and the
one-leg stand has an accuracy rate of sixty-five percent.66 However,
when the HGN test is combined with the walk-and-turn test, there is
a eighty percent accuracy rate.
6 7
These results seem to suggest that the HGN test is considerably
more accurate than the psychophysical tests to gauge intoxication at
roadside. But to reach such a conclusion is somewhat misleading, as
these percentages came from the NHTSA's 1984 laboratory study
involving 441 subjects who were administered various levels of alco-
hol.6 8 The NHTSA also reported the results of a field study involv-
ing 1500 drivers who were pulled over on the road.69 In that case,
the accuracy rates were as follows: HGN, eighty-two percent, walk-
and-turn, eighty percent, one-leg stand, seventy percent, and combi-
nation of HGN and walk-and-turn, eighty-three percent.70
The disparity between the results of the laboratory and field
tests raises several questions and criticisms. What at first appears to
be a rather significant finding in the laboratory test (that the HGN
test is nine to twelve percent more accurate than the walk-and-turn
and one-leg stand) seems somewhat negligible in the field study.
The field study indicates that by adding the HGN test, police officers
will be more accurate in predicting intoxication above the legal limit
at the most two to three percent of the time.
Moreover, the NHTSA fails to explain why the laboratory re-
sults produced lower accuracy rates when the laboratory tests ap-
(1) cannot keep balance while listening to instructions (1 point); (2) starts before the
instructions are finished (1 point); (3) while walking, stops to steady self (1 point);
(4) does not touch heel-to-toe (1 point); (5) steps off the line (1 point); (6) uses arms
to balance (I point); (7) loses balance while turning or turns incorrectly (1 point);
(8) incorrect number of steps (I point); (9) cannot do test (9 points).
A score of two or more points classifies the suspect as having a BAC of 0.10%0 or more.
NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 5 (dited in State v. Whiteacre, 601 N.E.2d 691,
698 (Bowling Green Mun. Ct. 1992)).
66 Good & Augsburger, supra note 35, at 468.
67 The NHTSA provides a "decision table" to effectively broaden the range of poten-
tial suspects with BACs of 0.10% or higher. As previously stated, the decisive score for
the HGN test is a four out of six and a two out of nine for the walk-and-turn test. How-
ever, by using the NHTSA grid system, a suspect can score higher on one test and lower
on the other and be classified as at least a 0.10%. For example, the table indicates that a
suspect is likely to have a BAC of at least 0.10% if he scores a three on the HGN and a
three on the walk-and-turn. NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 6.
68 Id. at 1.
69 Id. The NHTSA does not try to hide this difference. The two findings are
presented together. The comment's purpose in offering these results in this way is to
merely demonstrate why such statistics should not be accepted without inquiry. More-
over, articles that refer to the NHTSA's findings sometimes fail to specify whether they
are relying on the laboratory or field studies.
70 Id.
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peared to be more carefully controlled. Nor does the 1984 manual
describe the conditions under which these field tests were given. It
merely lists the states that participated in the exercise. While it is
commendable that police officers are able to identify a person driv-
ing under the influence, .the manual does not elaborate whether the
field success rate was due in part to other tell-tale signs of intoxica-
tion. For example, such signs include a swerving car, physical ap-
pearance, breath odor, condition of the eyes, color of the face,
dexterity, speech, and demeanor.
71
Not only do the results of the tests raise questions, but the
NHTSA's premise that a person with a 0.10% BAC level will display
horizontal gaze nystagmus at a forty-five degree angle is disputed as
well. Other studies indicate not only that the onset of HGN may
appear at angles other than forty-five degrees when the subject has a
BAC of 0.10%, but that HGN may appear at lower BAC levels as
well. For example, Professor Pangman notes that one researcher
observed HGN at forty degrees with a BAC level of 0.06%, and that
the onset of HGN also appeared at a thirty degree angle with a BAC
as low as 0.048%.72
This difference obviously raises questions about the reliability
of the HGN test. If nystagmus could appear in people at levels as
low as 0.048%, many would be arrested for DUI when they are not
legally intoxicated. Although it may be wrong to drive after con-
suming alcohol,73 a driver has not violated any law unless he has a
BAC level of at least 0.10%. Moreover, people with BAC levels of
0.10% may not exhibit gaze nystagmus until their eyes deviate to an
angle of fifty-one degrees.74 If the suspect has learned to pass the
psychophysical tests, the HGN test may also not detect intoxication.
The NHTSA's experimental procedure has been further chal-
lenged for its intentional screening out of those individuals highly
likely to be misclassified as false positives. 75 Reportedly, "[flifty to
sixty percent of all individuals exhibit a gaze nystagmus indistin-
guishable from AGN [Alcohol Gaze Nystagmus] if they deviate their
71 Id.
72 Pangman, supra note 32, at 2; 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 3.
73 Many groups have responded to the magnitude of the drunk driving problem by
campaigning for or passing legislation to limit the extent of drunk driving and its conse-
quences. Such groups include the insurance industry, Mothers Against Drug Driving
(MADD), the federal government, and state governments. Kelly Mahon Tullier, Govern-
mental Liability for Negligent Failure to Detain Drunk Drivers, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 873 (1992).
See also NHTSA DOT HS-807-186, supra note 13, at 8.
74 One researcher reported such a result. 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 3.
75 Pangman, supra note 32, at 2.
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eyes more than forty degrees to the side." 76
It comes as no surprise that false positives did not interfere with
NHTSA's results when one realizes that any test subjects showing
moderate to strong nystagmus at maximum lateral deviation of the
eyes and zero BAC were given placebo doses of alcohol, in order to
deliberately screen out people at high risk for being classified as false
positives. 7
7
Thus, the NHTSA's reasoning is flawed because it incorrectly as-
sumes that the influence of drugs is solely responsible for any nys-
tagmus detected at maximum lateral deviation in alcohol-free
subjects. 78 One must then question whether this screening process
has completely vitiated all other data based on the tests.
In fact, opponents of HGN testing refer to several elements
other than alcohol that may cause HGN, raising questions about its
use as a suitable predictor of intoxication. 79 For example, nystag-
mus can be congenital,80 accompany disease,8' be induced mechani-
cally, or even be associated with a person's occupation. 82 Drugs,
including anticonvulsants,8 3 antibiotics, salicytes, 84 anti-inflam-
matory agents, and antihistamines, 85 can also produce nystagmus.
Nystagmus can accompany stress or allergies86 or result from a
change in prescription glasses or cataract surgery. 87 Moreover,
many motorists, when suddenly confronted by police officers and
the flashing lights of patrol cars, may fail the test due to sheer ner-
76 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at 2.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 3.
79 See, e.g., James Norris, The Correlation of Angle of Onset .Nstagmus with Blood Alcohol
Level: Report of a Field Trial, 25J. FORENSIC Sci. Soc'Y 476 (1985); Ahern, supra note 23,
at § 1.160.
80 THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY, a medical reference book, lists a
variety of conditions which could cause such a motor disorder. Besides congenital ori-
gins, it is common in multiple sclerosis and may be due to conditions affecting the brain,
such as palsy of lateral or vertical gaze, disorders of the vestibular apparatus and brain-
stem, and cerebellar dysfunction. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note 31, at 1980.
81 Factors which bring about nystagmus include inner ear problems, influenza, strep-
tococcus infections, vertigo, measles, syphilis, arteriosclerosis, muscular dystrophy, mul-
tiple sclerosis, Korsakoff's Syndrome, brain hemorrhage, epilepsy, and other
psychogenic disorders. Pangman, supra note 32, at 3.
82 Ahern, supra note 23, at § 1.160.
83 NHTSA DOT HS 806-512, supra note 8, at 4.
84 Ahern, supra note 23, at § 1.160.
85 Rouleau, supra note 14, at 455.
86 Nystagmus is also brought on by hypertension, motion sickness, sunstroke, eyes-
train, eye muscle fatigue, glaucoma, changes in atmospheric pressure, and consumption
of caffeine, nicotine, or aspirin. Pangman, supra note 32, at 3.
87 Temporary nystagmus may result from extended use of the eyes under strained
conditions or from continued use in insufficient lighting. Id.
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vousness.8 8 Thus, there are many causes of HGN, most of which are
not related to BAC, that undermine the reliability of HGN testing in
DUI cases.
To further support the position against admitting HGN results
into evidence, critics compare HGN results to that of the poly-
graph.8 9 The polygraph test purports to be ninety to ninety-five
percent reliable, yet it is not admissible evidence.90 The HGN test is
similar to the polygraph test because both base their results on the
subjective conclusions of the examiner. Although the polygraph re-
quires added proof that the machine is in working order, both tests
acknowledge that the accuracy of the results depends upon the ex-
aminer's qualifications in administration and interpretation of the
test.91 For this reason, critics argue, if the polygraph is not admissi-
ble, the less accurate HGN test should not be accepted either.9 2
Yet the polygraph test is distinguishable from the HGN test.
First, the polygraph is an anomaly, as its results go to the ultimate
issue of credibility,9 3 meaning that the test purports to indicate with
a degree of certainty whether a witness is credible.9 4 Since the
finder of fact is responsible for determining the credibility of wit-
nesses, "[a] potential trial by polygraph is an unwarranted intrusion
into the jury function."9 5
88 Jesse Katz, Field Sobriety Test One Simple Tool, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1988, at 1.
89 The polygraph measures various physiologic responses which are precipitated by
emotional reactions. The theory behind this technique is that when an individual con-
sciously decides to lie, various involuntary physiological changes arise due to reactions
in the autonomic nervous system. The polygraph machine measures these responses.
See State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 760-61 (Or. 1984). The examiner must then interpret
these responses and "infer the presence of deception." TARANTINO, supra note 24, at
§ 602. The polygraph is unrelated to the topic of roadside sobriety testing. Its function
in this paper is to offer a means of comparison.
90 Essen & Levenstein, supra note 3, at 8. See, e.g., People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070
(Ill. 1982) (courts refuse to admit unstipulated polygraph evidence because of serious
doubts about the reliability and scientific recognition of the tests); Brown, 687 P.2d at
751 (polygraph evidence not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding that is con-
trolled by rules of evidence); ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIM-
INAL CASES § 14.09, at 712 (3d ed. 1986). But cf EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Standardfor
Admitting Sdentific Evidence: A Critique from The Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L.
REV. 554, 567-68 (1982-83) (questioning assumption that scientific evidence unduly in-
fluences jurors when studies suggest that juries have rendered verdicts inconsistent with
polygraph evidence).
91 Baynes, 430 N.E.2d at 1074. Like HGN opponents, those opposed to the poly-
graph also question the extent to which false positives are displayed. The polygraph is
also criticized to the extent that suspects are coached beforehand on how to pass the
test. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206(B) (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
92 See, e.g., Cowan &Jaffee, supra note 13, at 470.
93 Baynes, 430 N.E.2d at 1074.
94 Brown, 687 P.2d at 774.
95 Baynes, 430 N.E.2d at 1079.
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On the other hand, the function of the HGN test is to spot vis-
ual symptoms of intoxication. 96 The information obtained facili-
tates a conviction for DUI; it is not used to attack the truthfulness of
the defendant's statements. HGN evidence is valuable insofar as it
strengthens a case based upon a chemical test. Although chemical
tests may prove a high BAC level at the time of testing, they may not
establish an irrefutable case of driving under the influence of alco-
hol. 9 7 To establish a causal connection between high blood alcohol
concentration and driving impairment, it is essential to show that
while the driver was operating his vehicle, he was indeed affected by
alcohol. 98 Roadside sobriety tests help provide such proof.
The HGN test is more comparable to other tests. 99 An analogy
to hair analysis, for example, seems more appropriate. 10 0 Since hair
analysis is based on subjective visual observation and is routinely
admitted in court,10 ' the HGN test, which is also based on visual
96 NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 1.
97 Cowan &Jaffee, supra note 13, at 468.
98 Id. See also Ned R. Jaeckle, Constitutional Issues in Roadside Sobriety Testing, 20 CoLo.
LAW. 45 (1991).
99 There are two tests in particular that are comparable to HGN testing. One, hair
analysis, is discussed in the main text. A second test is on-site chemical screening. On-
site chemical screening tests are used by law enforcement as preliminary non-specific
field tests to classify and identify various controlled substances. GIANNELLI & IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 24, at § 23-2(B); United States v. Williams, 902 F.2d 678, 680
(1 th Cir. 1990). On-site drug screening involves the use of non-specific color change
tests in which an unidentified substance is mixed with a known reagent. The chemical
reaction will produce a color which is then compared to a color chart to suggest a possi-
ble substance. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, at § 23-2(B).
The use of these results are similar to what the NHTSA recommends for HGN.
These on-site screening tests are not conclusive, as the colors only represent a broad
spectral range of possible drugs. Thus, they are not intended to be used to positively
identify a substance. Walter J. Stall, Unreliability of Field Tests as Means of Identifying Con-
trolled Substances, 12 ADVOc. 398, 399 (1982); R.A. Velapoldi & S.A. Wicks, The Use of
Chemical Spot Test Kits for the Presumptive Identification of Narcotics and Drugs of Abuse, 19 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 636, 655 (1974) (asserting on-site test kits merely provide preliminary
and presumptive evidence; identification of a substance should not be made on this evi-
dence alone). See also, State v.Jacques, 579 P.2d 146, 156 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978); Curtis v.
State, 548 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (results of a marquis reagent test not
conclusive, as it indicates only that an opium derivative is present).
Similarly, the HGN test recognizes nystagmus in the eye, but the witness may not
testify that alcohol is the sole cause of the nystagmus. Rather, the expert may only tes-
tify that alcohol is one of the causes of nystagmus. See State ex rel. Hamilton v. City Court
of Mesa, 799 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1990).
100 Trace evidence, such as hair, is used to identify perpetrators of crimes. TARAN-
TINO, supra note 24, at § 3.01. One judicially accepted method is for an expert to render
an opinion as to the identity of an individual source of human hair through microscopic
or chemical means. Id. at §§ 3.17-.18.
101 See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1992) (holding hair comparison evidence
identifying a suspect or victim as a possible donor has been routinely admitted in Cali-
fornia for many years without any suggestion that it is unreliable under Fiye); Common-
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observation, should therefore, not necessarily be discounted. Hair
analysis is not an exact science. Technicians are unable to positively
conclude that a hair sample came from a particular individual. 0 2
Thus, a qualified witness on hair identification and comparison can
provide relevant testimony but cannot make a positive identifica-
tion. 10 3 A "match" means that two samples share general character-
istics, not that they are identical. 0 4 Likewise, in the absence of
chemical analyses, police officers may not testify to an exact BAC
level. 10 5 Just as hair experts can testify that samples were "alike,"
"similar," or "compatible,"'' 0 6 the HGN "expert" can say that based
on his observations of the onset of HGN at forty-five degrees, re-
sults indicate possible neurological dysfunction, which may be
caused by alcohol ingestion. 10 7
On the other hand, although the HGN test is similar to hair
analysis, hair analysis seems to offer a defendant an added protec-
tion that HGN does not afford. A hair sample can be reexamined at
a later date in order to get more than one opinion as to a match.
Thus, any difference in expert opinion applies to the weight of the
evidence, not to the admissibility.'10  The HGN test, in contrast, is
wholly subjective-the police officer has no physical sample to take
to a laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his expert
examine the evidence. The defendant, therefore, cannot contradict
the officer's testimony. He can only try to damage the officer's cred-
ibility by questioning the officer's ability to administer the test and
his knowledge of the theories behind the HGN test. 10 9
Aside from the lack of lingering physical evidence, however,
HGN is quite similar to hair analysis in terms of the appropriate
weight accorded to the evidence by the jury. In both cases, the test
results are presented by an "expert" whom the jury may believe just
because of his aura of expertise. The defendant's attorney, there-
wealth v. McCauley, 588 A.2d 941, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding microscopic hair
comparison evidence is admissible as scientific evidence under F'e).
102 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 8.09.
103 State v. Bridges, 421 S.E.2d 806, 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
104 TARANTINO, supra note 24, at § 3.18.
105 State ec rel. Hamilton v. City Court of Mesa, 799 P.2d 855, 857 (Ariz. 1990).
106 TARANTINO, supra note 24, at § 3.18.
107 Hamilton, 799 P.2d at 860.
108 MOENssENs ET AL., supra note 90, at § 8.14 (citing People v. Kirkwood, 160 N.E.2d
766 (Il1. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 847 (1960)); see also United States v. Oaxaca, 569
F.2d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding hair comparison testimony admissible even
though expert acknowledged some two million people had similar hair; the uncertainty
of the match goes to the weight of the evidence, not to the admissibility).




fore, must cross-examine the expert to expose the potential weak-
nesses of the test.
One of the test's shortcomings is that the officer administering
the test may not be properly trained to understand all aspects of the
test and to produce results as accurately as the NHTSA manual sug-
gests.110 Thus, the "expert" faces a series of questions attacking his
technique in administering the test. In cases involving hair analysis,
an expert can be asked whether he obtained the requisite number of
hairs from a subject to ensure that the ranges of all characteristics
are adequately represented.' Moreover, it is recommended that
head hair samples be taken from five different areas of the scalp.
Samples should be both pulled and combed. For exclusionary pur-
poses, samples should be taken from all persons who might be con-
sidered the source of the hair.
112
Questions about following proper procedure are also asked to
experts in DUI cases involving HGN testing. Although an officer
may use his flashlight as a chinrest for the suspect, the stability of
the head is a critical factor in determining the accuracy of the test. "1
3
Other problems with accuracy include: whether the police officer
followed the NHTSA's recommendation that initial movement
should be made at the rate of about twenty degrees per second;
whether the officer knew how far the stimulus (pen or finger) should
be held from the suspect's face; and whether the twitching of the
eyes was really caused by twitching of the penlight. 114 Furthermore,
the time of day has proven to be a relevant factor in HGN testing."t 5
For example, some argue that the test is unreliable due to the diffi-
culty in accurately determining a forty-five degree angle in varying
light conditions, especially late night.' 16 During training, each of-
ficer learns to determine a forty-five degree angle by using a tem-
plate. 117 Such devices are unavailable in the field. 118 Finally, just as
110 Officers are required to spend a certain amount of time attending training sessions
in order to be certified. See In re Doe, 844 P.2d 679, 680 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992); Emerson
v. State, 846 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Seelmeyer, supra note 1, at 30.
IIl MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 8.10.
112 Id.
113 Pangman, supra note 32, at 3.
114 Rouleau, supra note 14, at 483.
115 See Steve Rothaus, Judges Are Divided on Eye Test for DUI, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30,
1991, at 3B; Pangman, supra note 30, at 3.
116 See Rothaus, supra note 115, at 3B. On a similar note, one study looked at bi-
orhythms which affect internal biological clocks and found that after midnight, the angle
of onset was decreased by five degrees. Critics of the HGN test note that fact that this
type of "sensitivity enhancement" was omitted from the NHTSA's manual. Pangman,
supra note 32, at 3.
117 It is suggested that the officers examine the eyes of four or five people so that they
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a hair analysis expert can testify that there is no technique known
that can positively identify a crime scene hair as coming from a spe-
cific individual,1 19 the expert in HGN testing should admit that the
HGN test does have several faults, the most serious of which is the
number of causes of HGN other than alcohol.
Although there is much to discuss on cross-examination, the
defense must face the possibility that the jury will simply take the
officer's word as truth, 120 not realizing that the defense has raised
legitimate concerns about the HGN test. Yet, such a potential prob-
lem should not automatically discount the admissibility of the HGN
test. This comment rejects the analogy made by critics to the poly-
graph test and embraces and approach similar to hair analysis.
Thus, pending further analysis, it is premature to reject the HGN
test outright based on initial criticism.
III. JUDICIAL STANDARDS
If HGN testing is effectively used in trials, it could act as a de-
terrent to driving while intoxicated. If violators fear that they will be
caught and successfully prosecuted, there is a chance that they will
stop committing DUI offenses.1 21 Public policy, however, is not a
sufficient reason to freely admit HGN test results into evidence. Be-
cause its accuracy depends upon human proficiency, the HGN test is
not conclusive. Therefore if this test is to be admissible, the courts
must choose a standard by which to judge admissibility of this scien-
tific evidence.
Rules of evidence exist to prevent unfair prejudice, jury confu-
sion, and undue consumption of time and trial resources. 122 Thus,
courts may exclude relevant1 23 evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. 124 Unlike other forms of testi-
become familiar with a 45 degree angle of gaze. They should then practice without the
device to be sure that their accuracy has been sustained. NHTSA DOT HS-806-512,
supra note 8, at 3.
118 Halperin & Yolton, supra note 17, at 655. The DOT manual does not say why a
template is not used in the field. Although it may seem cumbersome or unusual, it may
enable the police officers to be able to state more definitely that the angle that they
recorded was accurate.
119 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 8.13.
120 Rouleau, supra note 14, at 456.
121 NHTSA DOT HS-807-186, supra note 13, at 11.
122 State v. Superior Court ex reL County of Cochise (Blake), 718 P.2d 171, 178 (Ariz.
1986) (citing State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981)). See also FED. R. EvID. 102.
123 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
124 FED. R. EvID. 403.
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mony, however, the probative value of scientific evidence is often
overestimated.' 25 Lawyers note that jurors will often attribute an
"aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" to such evidence.' 26
Because jurors may overestimate the probative value of scientific ev-
idence, courts apply special rules of admissibility to such testi-
mony. 127 The following sections explore three standards that courts
use to judge the admissibility of scientific evidence.
A. THE FRYE TEST
One approach, which until recently has predominated in most
jurisdictions, 128 and which has been used thus far by most state
courts ruling on the admissibility of HGN evidence, holds scientific
evidence to a "special, extraordinary standard" of admission.
129
This traditional standard, which requires "general acceptance" of
scientific evidence, was announced in Frye v. United States.13 0 In Frye,
the defendant was convicted of murder after the trial court sus-
tained the government's objection to the defendant's introduction
of the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test.' 3 1 Defense
counsel attempted to introduce the testimony of the scientist who
conducted the test. In affirming the judgment, the appellate court
held that this lie detector test was inadmissible because it had not
yet gained proper standing and scientific recognition to justify ad-
mitting such expert testimony.'
32
The court relied neither on authority nor precedent in reaching
its holding:
33
125 Imwinkelried, supra note 90, at 563 (citing Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md.
1978)). See also State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 178.
126 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (quoting United States v. Amaral,
488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)). See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting jurors often impute a mystic infallibility to scientific
testimony).
127 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at § 203.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1970); People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md.
1978); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495, 502-05 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 898 (195 1) (cited in Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1206 nn. 54-55
(1980)); State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (Wis. 1933).
129 Imwinkelried, supra note 90, at 556.
130 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
131 The blood pressure deception test was the forerunner of today's polygraph test.
132 Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
133 Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1205 (1980).
218 [Vol. 84
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or dis-
covery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.134
According to Frye, a novel technique must pass through an "ex-
perimental" stage in which it is scrutinized by the scientific commu-
nity.'13 5 It is not enough that qualified experts ensure the validity of
a scientific technique; the technique must also gain general accept-
ance within the relevant scientific community.' 3 6 This requirement
proports to guarantee that the general validity of a scientific tech-
nique will be evaluated and agreed upon by those most qualified to
assess the method.1
37
Some commentators view the "general acceptance" standard as
overly strict'38 because gaining general acceptance takes a great
deal of time. If the relevant scientific community is viewed with par-
ticularity, a new scientific technique could be accepted through the
opinions of only a few experts,' 3 9 thus departing from the true na-
ture of the Frye standard. 140 On the other hand, if the relevant sci-
entific community is interpreted broadly, the Frye test can be a
rigorous barrier to admissibility. Requiring any sizable group to
formally accept the test will produce "cultural lag"'14 1 as courts will
inevitably trail modem science.' 42
B. THE RELEVANCY TEST
Poignant criticisms of Frye have led Professor McCormick and
others to advocate the second standard, a "relevancy approach." 43
134 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
135 Id.
136 Only after the scientific technique has passed to the demonstrable stage will it
receive judicial notice. State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Cochise (Blake), 718
P.2d 171, 178-79 (Ariz. 1986). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 951
F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
137 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
138 See M. Thaddeus Murphy, Comment, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in Illinois,
21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 935, 940 (1990).
139 Id.
140 Giannelli, supra note 133, at 1209-10.
141 SeeJ. Alexander Tanford et al., Novel Scientific Evidence of Intoxication: Acoustic Analy-
sis of Voice Recordings From The Ecxon I'aldez, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 593
(1992).
142 See Murphy, supra note 138, at 943.




This rule would admit any expert testimony "deemed helpful and
germane to the scientific issue before the court."1 44 Specifically,
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." 1
45
Aspects of relevancy include the validity of the underlying prin-
ciple, and the validity and application of the technique applying the
principle. 146 For example, a court should consider
the 'novelty'147 of the new technique, the existence of specialized liter-
ature dealing with it, the qualifications and professional stature of ex-
pert witnesses, the frequency with which a technique leads to
erroneous results and the type of error generated, and whether expert
testimony has been offered in earlier cases to support or dispute its
merits. 1
4 8
C. THE DAUBERT TEST
In 1993, the Supreme Court changed the longstanding reliance
on the Frye test when it asserted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. 149 that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.
Daubert ended the disagreement among the lower federal courts
over whether HGN evidence should be held to Frye's "general ac-
ceptance" standard, or to the Federal Rules of Evidence's more lib-
eral "relevancy" approach. 150
Daubert was a summary judgment case in which infants and their
144 Peter Huber,Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 722, 732 (1992). Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence has been called the "helpfulness test" because
relevant testimony helps the trier of fact. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE MANUAL T 13.02[01] (1991).
145 FED. R. EVID. 702. Many states have adopted a similar rule. See IOWA R. EVID. 702
(quoted in State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 156 n.1 (Iowa 1990)); IDAHO R. EVID. 702
(quoted in State v. Gleason, 844 P.2d 691, 694 n.1 (Idaho 1992)); MoNT. R. EVID. 702
(quoted in State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988)).
146 Giannelli, supra note 133, at 1200-01.
147 Novel scientific evidence rests on a scientific hypothesis that has not previously
been accorded judicial recognition as an appropriate basis for expert testimony. WEIN-
STEIN & BERGER, supra note 144, at 13.02[04].
148 Essen & Levenstein, supra note 3, at 7-8 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that testimony concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification by an expert in human perception and memory was
admissible)).
149 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
150 Because many state courts have yet to abandon Frye and adopt Daubert, the Frve test
remains important, if no longer universal.
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guardians ad litem sued Merrell Dow to recover for birth defects al-
legedly caused by their mother's use of Bendectin, an anti-nausea
drug.15 1 The issue before the lower courts was whether reanalysis
was a generally accepted scientific technique that should pass the
Frye test. The District Court held, and the Court of Appeals af-
firmed, that the test did not comply with the Frye standard of general
acceptance because re-analysis in question was not verified and scru-
tinized by others in the field.152
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded this case.' 53 Call-
ing the Frye standard "austere", the Court stated that it should not
be applied in federal trials, as nothing in Rule 702 establishes gen-
eral acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. 154
Although it may at first appear that Daubert has definitively estab-
lished a clear and concise rule, on a more careful reading, it be-
comes apparent that the Court has done somewhat less.
On one hand, the Court did state that even though the Frye test
was displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, it did not mean that
the Rules placed no limits on the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. 155 The trial judge must determine whether the subject of an
expert's testimony is "scientific knowledge"' 156 and whether the tes-
timony can be supported by appropriate validation. Moreover,
there must be a valid scientific connection between the expert testi-
mony and the pertinent inquiry. 157 In other words, Daubert asks
judges to make decisions on a case by case basis.
On the other hand, perhaps the Court presumed too much
when it said "[w]e are confident that federal judges possess the ca-
pacity to undertake this review,"' 58 because such a review entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether it can be
properly applied to the facts in issue. 159 It is at this point that
Daubert loses its punch. Rather than set forth a clear standard for
trial judges to follow, the majority opinion merely noted that judges
have a "gatekeeping" role without explaining exactly what this role
151 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991), reversed and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
152 Id. at 1129, 1131.
153 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2786.
154 Id. at 2794.
155 Id. at 2795.
156 To qualify as scientific knowledge, an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method. Id.





entails. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in his dissent, properly recognized
that the aftermath of this opinion will be "countless more questions
... when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to
particular offers of expert testimony."' 60
In relying on federal16' judges to assume responsibility for the
quality of scientific evidence presented, 62 the Daubert decision is to
an extent, a continuation of Frye, albeit in modified form. The Court
admitted that even though general acceptance is not a necessary
precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence, it can have a
bearing on the inquiry into its reliability.' 63 In fact, the Court not
only acknowledged that widespread acceptance of a particular tech-
nique may be an important factor to consider in determining admis-
sibility, but maintained that a judge may view with skepticism any
method which, though known, has nonetheless failed to attract any-
thing more than minimal support within the community. 164
Even under the new Daubert standard, a problem which has
plagued scientific evidence remains: how can the court prevent the
trier of fact from giving undue weight to scientific or quasi-scientific
evidence, 65 even though not all such evidence carries with it an
"aura of infallibility?"' 66 Professor McCormick suggests a solution:
if the technique is demonstrable in the courtroom, and the jury can
understand its principles and procedures, the test should be admis-
sible because experts will not "exert undue influence" over the
jury. 1
67 The psychophysical roadside sobriety tests such as the walk-
and-turn and one-legged stand are based on the scientific theory
that an intoxicated person's inability to perform the test is related to
the level of alcohol in the person's bloodstream.' 68 These field tests
receive judicial notice because they monitor common reactions to
alcohol.' 69 On the other hand, esoteric or invisible analysis (e.g.,
160 Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
161 Although Daubert applies only to federal courts, state courts will probably use it as
a guideline. Natalie Angier, Ruling on Scientific Evidence: A Just Burden, N.Y. TIMEs, June
30, 1993, at 12A.
162 The Court suggested that judges determine whether the scientific methodology
was tested to see if it could be falsified; whether the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; and consider the known or potential rate of error
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
163 Id. at 2797.
164 Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d. Cir. 1985)).
165 Carper & McCamey, supra note 11, at 147.
166 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 91, at § 203.
167 Id.
168 State v. Reed, 732 P.2d 66, 68 (Or. 1987).
169 In Oregon, judicial notice is given to the following signs of alcohol intoxication:
odor of breath, flushed appearance, lack of muscular coordination, speech difficulties,
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biochemical analysis) may warrant a showing of stronger probative
value 170 because understanding the method in question wholly de-
pends on expert testimony.' 71 HGN seems to fall in between these
two types of analyses.
HGN is not known to the average person, it does have a medical
link, and it is not easily recognized or understood by most peo-
ple.1 72 Therefore, if the jury can understand that alcohol causes
poor coordination, then perhaps the solution is to help the jury un-
derstand the relationship between alcohol and a less obvious physi-
cal response. To relieve HGN of its mystique, perhaps a prosecutor
should give a demonstration of HGN in the courtroom to help the
jury understand the procedure.
IV. STATE V SUPERIOR COURT EX REL COUNTY OF COCHISE
(BLAKE) 
173
Not all state courts have ruled on the issue of horizontal gaze
nystagmus testing and its use as scientific evidence. 174 In fact, state
courts have only begun addressing this issue in reported opinions in
the last seven years. 175 The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in
State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Cochise (Blake) 176 is considered
the "most extensively researched and well-reasoned case dealing
with the issue of admissibility of HGN tests." 177
In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court granted review of the
admissibility of the HGN test as a matter of first impression for the
court.178 The defendant, Blake, was stopped by an officer who had
observed his vehicle "meandering" within its lane. The officer rec-
ognized signs of intoxication from Blake's appearance and pro-
ceeded to administer a battery of six field sobriety tests. Blake's
performance on the first three tests was "fair", but the HGN test
established that his BAC was over 0.10%. At the station, Blake reg-
istered a BAC of 0.163% on the intoxilyzer test.
179
disorderly or unusual conduct, visual disorder, dizziness, nausea, muscular tremors, and
mental disturbances. Id. at 68 n.2 (quoting State v. Clark, 593 P.2d 123 (Or. 1979)).
170 Giannelli, supra note 133, at 1237. See also Tanford, supra note 141, at 601.
171 Giannelli, supra note 133, at 1236.
172 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
173 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986).
174 See supra note 12, listing states which have thus far addressed this issue.
175 Up to that point cases had simply mentioned the use of the HGN test. See, e.g.,
State v. McNaught, 713 P.2d 457, 462 (Kan. 1986); State v. Kelly, 786 P.2d 623, 625
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
176 718 P.2d at 171.
177 State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 886 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
178 State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 172.
179 Id. at 173.
1993] 223
STEPHANIE E. BUSLOFF
The defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution for lack of
probable cause to arrest and to preclude admission of testimony of
the HGN test and its results in trial. At the evidentiary hearing, the
state called as witnesses a research psychologist who studied the ef-
fects of alcohol on behavior, two police sergeants, and the arresting
officer.'80 The trial court held that HGN represented a new scien-
tific principle and consequently was subject to the Frye standard of
admissibility. 8 ' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's find-
ing that the HGN test itself satisfied Frye and that the test would
have been admissible except for the state's insufficient foundation
regarding the arresting officer's proficiency in administering the
test. 182
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the HGN test and its re-
sults satisfied the Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence. 1
83
The court stated that "general acceptance" requires neither univer-
sal acceptance nor absolute accuracy.' 8 4 To gain general accept-
180 Id.
181 The trial court also held that the HGN test did not satisfy Frye. It deemed the test
unreliable, and held that it could not form the basis of probable cause to arrest. The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that F?-ve only pertained to the admissibility of
evidence at trial, and not to the issue of probable cause to arrest. It noted that probable
cause only requires "reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonable
person to believe an offense had been committed and the person to be arrested commit-
ted the offense." Id. at 174.
182 Id. at 174-75.
183 State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Cochise (Blake), 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz.
1986).
The court established three other propositions. First, it stated that administering
roadside sobriety tests does not require probable cause, and second, that evidence used
to establish probable cause need not be tested under Fye. Accord State v. Grier, 791
P.2d 627, 631 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); State v. Royce, 616 A.2d 284 (Conn. App. Ct.
1992); People v.Jebelian, 561 N.E.2d 1079 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Furness, 526
N.E.2d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Angle v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 758 P.2d 226 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Whiteacre, 601 N.E.2d 691 (Bowling Green Mun. Ct. 1992).
Third, the court stated that this sort of stop did not violate the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. The Fourth amendment guarantees the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure. This guarantee requires arrests to be based on prob-
able cause and permits limited investigatory stops based only on an articulable reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In analyzing the
constitutionality of roadside sobriety testing, the court relied on Tern, which stated that
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to con-
clude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ... he is entitled to
conduct a carefully limited search .... " 392 U.S. at 30. As the court held that people
who drive under the influence of alcohol pose a threat to public safety, the state has a
compelling interest to remove drunk drivers from highways. State v. Superior Court, 718
P.2d at 176. If roadside tests do not involve long delays and unreasonable intrusion,
these searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. For additional cases concern-
ing Fourth Amendment issues, see supra note 6 1.
184 State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 181.
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ance, the technique must be validated by scientists other than those
who have professional and personal interest in the outcome of the
evaluation.18 5 After discussing the different professional fields that
might be interested in the validity of the HGN test, the court con-
cluded that the appropriate disciplines which comprise the relevant
scientific community included behavioral psychology, highway
safety and, to a lesser extent, neurology and criminalistics.18 6
In holding that the HGN test satisfied the Frye test for admissi-
bility, the court determined that several propositions had gained
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.18 7 The
court reasoned that (1) HGN occurs in conjunction with alcohol
consumption; (2) its onset and distinctness are correlated to BAC;
(3) BAC in excess of 0.10% can be estimated with reasonable accu-
racy from the combination of the eyes' tracking ability, angle of on-
set of nystagmus, and the degree of nystagmus at maximum
deviation; and (4) officers can be trained to observe these phenom-
ena sufficiently to estimate accurately whether BAC is above or be-
low 0.10%.188
In 1990, the Arizona Supreme Court granted review in another
DUI case to clarify State v. Superior Court as applied to cases in which
no chemical analyses of the defendant's blood, breath or urine was
conducted. In State ex rel. Hamilton v. City Court of of Mesa,'8 9 the
court held that in the absence of a chemical analysis, an officer may
neither testify to the accuracy of the HGN test result in estimating a
person's BAC nor estimate the extent to which a suspect's BAC was
above or below 0.10%.19o Testimony is limited to describing the
officer's education and experience and to a statement that, based on
the officer's training, the officer had determined that the results of
185 However, the relevant scientific acceptance is often self-selecting. The court be-
lieved that only those with actual interest in the new scientific principle would likely
evaluate it. Id. at 179.
186 Pharmacologists and ophthalmologists were not included because, although they
may be concerned with the connection between alcohol and nystagmus, they are not
specifically concerned with the affects of alcohol on performance of the field sobriety
tests. Id. at 180.
187 Id. at 181.
188 Id. On remand, the appellate court in State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of
Cochise (Blake II), 718 P.2d 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), held the foundation for admit-
ting HGN evidence is established by showing that the officer has been certified, that the
officer has maintained his or her skill by continually working with the test, and that the
officer maintained an 80% proficiency rate. That the court did not specify what fre-
quency constituted "continually" has troubled the Arizona courts and other jurisdic-
tions as well. See State v. Superior Court (Blake II), 718 P.2d at 192; Lusk, supra note 43, at
28.
189 799 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1990).
190 Id. at 858. See also State v. Ricke, 778 P.2d 1358 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
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the HGN test "indicated a neurological impairment, one cause of
which could be alcohol ingestion."'u 9
The court reasoned that although reporting HGN test results
which indicate a BAC in excess of 0.10% may be relevant to a DUI
charge, its potential to confuse and unduly influence the jury out-
weighed its probative value. 192 Moreover, the court repeated its
warning in State v. Superior Court that using the HGN test to quantify
intoxication in lieu of available chemical devices raises due process
problems.' 9
3
V. POST-STATE V SUPERIOR COURT ANALYSIS
State v. Superior Court has proven to be a precedent-setting case,
relied upon by almost every jurisdiction faced with this issue. The
weight given to its holding by other courts depends upon factors
such as whether or not the state follows Frye, 194 and whether or not
it actually considers the HGN test "scientific." These decisions indi-
cate that the HGN test still faces a considerable degree of confusion
and uncertainty and that the status of an examining officer's testi-
mony is questionable.
Cases examining the admissibility of HGN tests can be under-
stood in the context of a continuum, beginning with the creation of
a theory and ending where the theory receives judicial notice. This
section will thus briefly outline a six-stage process for the admissi-
191 Hamilton, 799 P.2d at 858. See also State v. Albrecht, 811 P.2d 791 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
192 Hamilton, 799 P.2d at 859.
193 Id. at 858 (quoting State v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Cochise (Blake), 718
P.2d 171, 181 (Ariz. 1986)).
Embodied in due process is the concept of basic rights of the defendant in criminal
proceedings, and requisites for a fair trial. The defendant is thereby denied due process
if any question of fact is conclusively presumed against him. See BLACK's LAW DICTION-
ARY 500-01 (6th ed. 1990). See also McClean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). According to State v.
Superior Court and Hamilton, a defendant would be denied due process because an arrest-
ing officer's "reading" of the HGN test at roadside could not be verified or duplicated
by an independent party. "[Allthough it carries a scientific patina, [the HGN test] is
clearly unchallengeable by independent means, other than by cross-examining the of-
ficer who administered the test." State ex rel. Hamilton v. City Court of Mesa, 799 P.2d
855, 858 (Ariz. 1990).
194 The Fiye standard is meant to insure that the validity of a scientific theory is criti-
cally evaluated by experts; to promote a degree of uniformity of decision; to avoid the
cost and confusion of assessing the reliability of a scientific technique at trial; to insure
that when the technique is introduced, it will not only be reliable and relevant, but will
not unduly influence the trier of fact who cannot accurate evaluate its reliability; and to
impose a threshold standard of reliability, as it is unlikely that the trier of fact will effec-
tively learn of the technique's inaccuracies through cross-examination. MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2 (3d ed. 1991).
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bility of scientific evidence.19 5 Within this framework a logical pro-
gression of judicial acceptance can be identified, thereby
illuminating the points at which courts have been in dispute over the
use of horizontal gaze nystagmus in the courtroom. This section
will conclude by speculating as to what may happen if state courts
choose to follow the Supreme Court's decision regarding Rule 702's
relevancy standard as posited in Daubert 196
Professor Andre Moenssens lists six identifiable stages in bring-
ing a novel technique from concept to evidence:
Stage 1: A theory is postulated.
Stage 2: Experiments are designed to verify the validity of the theory.
Stage 3: If the theory's validity is not disproven after searching inquiry
and empirical testing, it is "proven" valid and the court may take judi-
cial notice of the theory.
197
Stage 4: A technique is devised, or an instrument is designed and built,
that will permit the theory to be applied practically in a forensic
setting.
Stage 5: After devising a methodology, further tests must demonstrate
a positive correlation between the results and the underlying theory.
This is necessary to prove that the effects observed are not the results
of some unidentified cause.
Stage 6: After the test has been shown to yield reliable results that are
relevant to disputed issues in a law suit, a court then may admit these
results properly into evidence, and a qualified expert may interpret the
results before the jury. 198
Although specific details and circumstances distinguish each of
the post-State v. Superior Court cases, the facts are relatively similar.
For the purpose of this discussion, this comment will assume the
following scenario: The police stop a suspect's vehicle because of
erratic driving. The suspect claims that he only had one or two
beers, or blames his driving on other factors, such as prescription
medicine or unfamiliarity with the car. The examining officer ad-
ministers three field-sobriety tests199 and records the results which
indicate intoxication. The suspect is brought to the station where
he registers a BAC above 0.10% on the breathalyzer test. He is ar-
rested for DUI and the case is brought to trial. 200
At trial the state introduces evidence that he was driving under
195 See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 1.03; Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence; An Alternative to Frye, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 556 (1984).
196 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
197 Moenssens notes that this is unlikely because at this stage there is no effective way
to translate the theory into relevant evidence.
198 Moenssens, supra note 195, at 556.
199 According to the NHTSA's 1984 manual, the three tests will be the walk-and-turn
test, the one-leg stand test, and the HGN test. See supra notes 1 & 8.
200 See, e.g., State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992).
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the influence of alcohol. The technician who analyzed the chemical
test testifies to the blood alcohol content of the sample, and the of-
ficer who pulled the defendant over testifies to his number of years
as an officer and to the extent of his training in the detection of
intoxicated persons, including advance training in HGN testing.
20 1
The officer testifies that field sobriety tests are routinely adminis-
tered to drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol,
unless the driver is physically unable or refuses to undergo such
tests. 20 2 When the officer is asked to describe what the HGN test is,
defense counsel objects that either the officer lacks the medical
background and expertise required to answer this question,203 or
that the HGN test has not reached a level of verifiable certainty and
acceptance by the scientific community for the purposes used in the
case. 20 4 The court then decides whether or not to allow such testi-
mony into evidence.
A. STAGES ONE TO THREE: THEORY IS POSTULATED AND
EXPERIMENTS ARE PERFORMED TO PROVE VALIDITY OF
THEORY
The HGN test has passed through stages one, two and three,
and courts dispute its validity at the other three stages. Yet, before
contrasting the responses of different courts to this issue, it is neces-
sary to have at least a brief understanding of the progression of the
HGN test from theory (stages one, two and three) into technique
(stage four) in order to see how courts have arrived at the latter
stages.
The correlation between alcohol intoxication and nystagmus
had been examined for years within the scientific community. These
studies, however, had nothing to do with DUI and police enforce-
ment. Rather, they were controlled experiments that enabled doc-
tors and researchers to study the effects of alcohol on the
oculomotor system.20 5 Researchers postulated that nystagmus ap-
peared after a period of alcohol consumption, being more pro-
201 See, e.g., Emerson v. State, 846 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
202 See, e.g., In re Doe, 844 P.2d 679, 681 (Haw. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 847 P.2d 263
(Haw. 1992).
203 See, e.g., Emerson, 846 S.W.2d at 532; People v. Leahy, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1992).
204 See, e.g., Manley v. State, 424 S.E.2d 818, 819 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
205 See Henry Murphee et al., Effect of Congeners in Alcoholic Beverages on the Incidence of
Nystagmus, 27 Q. J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 201 (1966); Alfred R. Fregly et al., Relationships
between Blood Alcohol, Positional Alcohol Nystagmus and Postural Equilibrium, 28 Q. J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 11 (1967); Umeda & Sakata, supra note 36.
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nounced with higher levels of alcohol concentration in the
bloodstream.
In 1976, Tharp, Moskowitz and Burns suggested that the HGN
test would be "an excellent sobriety test for police to use." 20 6 Using
a controlled setting in which subjects were tested on four separate
occasions at different times of night, the researchers reported a
"highly significant correlation" (r - -0.76) between the angle of on-
set of HGN and a person's blood alcohol content. Research into the
development of the roadside psychophysical tests resulted in the
theory that the HGN test could assist police officers in the screening
of DUI suspects. 20 7 Thus, other experiments, both controlled labo-
ratory tests and field tests, were designed to further verify the valid-
ity of this theory.
The NHTSA began to look seriously at the potential of nystag-
mus as a roadside detection device.208 After experimentation, re-
searchers reported that police officers who use the HGN test could
judge whether the driver's BAC was above or below 0.10%.209
However, the results indicated that its use as a totally reliable pre-
dictor of blood alcohol level was questionable. 210 In any event, for
this theory to be put into practice, a technique was needed to stand-
ardize testing and make the HGN test an effective tool for spotting
intoxicated drivers.
B. STAGE FOUR: THEORY TRANSLATED INTO TECHNIQUE SO THAT THE
THEORY MAY BE APPLIED IN A FORENSIC SETTING
Relying on the premise that alcohol effects the automatic track-
ing mechanisms of the eyes, 211 the NHTSA created guidelines for
officers in administering field sobriety tests.212 It required officers
to follow specific procedures in order to reach anticipated observa-
tions. It is at this point that the aforementioned scenario is first ana-
lyzed by some courts. The police officer in the hypothetical case
followed the procedures for administering all recommended road-
side tests, concluded that the driver was intoxicated and arrested the
driver for DUI. At trial the officer simply testifies to all the visual
indicators that made him deduce that the defendant was intoxicated.
206 V.K. Tharp et al., Abstracts of Papers Presented at the 20th Annual Meeting of the Society
for Psychophysical Research, Circadian Effects on Alcohol Gaze NVystagrnus, 18 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
193 (1981).
207 See Carper & McCamey, supra note 11, at 147.
208 See Seelmeyer, supra note 1, at 29.
209 Id.
210 See Norris, supra note 79, at 476.
211 Tenney, supra note 5, at 180.
212 See NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8.
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In doing so, the officer treats the HGN test the same as the
psychophysical tests.
Moenssens criticizes some courts for allowing opinion testi-
mony to be admitted after only the fourth stage has been satis-
fied. 21 3 Yet, the courts acted precisely in this manner in State v.
Bresson 214 and State v. Murphy.2 15 Not only did the courts in these
cases admit the evidence, but they held that the results of the HGN
test could be admitted as pure opinion testimony as well.
2 16
In Bresson, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
"HGN cannot be compared to other scientific tests, such as the
polygraph examination, since no special equipment is required in its
administration.- 21 7 Rather, the results of the HGN test are no dif-
ferent than any other field-sobriety test. 2 18 Similarly, the Iowa
Supreme Court maintained that "a lay witness may express an opin-
ion regarding another person's sobriety, provided the witness has
had an opportunity to observe the other person. ' 219 Therefore, it
made no sense to limit the admissibility of such evidence just be-
cause the witness was trained to recognize the characteristics of in-
toxication. Thus, the HGN test was admitted without relying on
expert opinion, as any witness may simply testify to personal
observation. 2
20
This proposal seems problematic for two reasons. First, these
courts have reasoned that "[b]ecause the test may be easily adminis-
tered and its results objectively recorded by a properly trained of-
ficer, it is unnecessary to establish the foundation for such evidence
through scientific testimony." 22 1 It seemed to be sufficient that the
officer revealed he was instructed on the use of the HGN test as part
of his training.222 However, the results are not necessarily easily un-
derstood just because a test is easily administered and observed.
While many people can understand the connection between the in-
gestion of alcohol and the body's inability to maintain balance, few
can claim similar knowledge as to the effects of alcohol on the
213 See MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 1.03.
214 554 N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990).
215 451 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1990).
216 Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1336; Murphy, 451 N.W.2d at 156.
217 Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1336.
218 Id.
219 Mlurphy, 451 N.W.2d at 155 (quoting State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Iowa
1972)).
220 Id. See also Lancaster v. State, 772 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); People v.
Loomis, 203 Cal. Rptr. 767, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).




HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST
eyes. 223
Second, these courts are misguided in determining that HGN is
objective in nature.224 The key to success regarding the HGN test is
the ability to accurately assess a forty-five degree angle and differen-
tiate between HGN and various other eye movements. 225 The
"proof" of intoxication therefore merely amounts to various opin-
ions. No physical sample remains for future verification.
Admitting the HGN test as evidence at this stage not only has
the effect of disregarding the purpose of Frye (to ensure the validity
of a scientific technique through general acceptance within the rele-
vant scientific community), 226 but also proves inadequate if state
courts in the future opt to follow Daubert and its interpretation of the
relevancy approach.
The Supreme Court in Daubert commented that a judge must be
satisfied that the quality of evidence presented is sound before it
may be admitted in the courtroom. A court should consider, among
other things, a technique's rate of error and whether the methodol-
ogy could be falsified.227 Thus, admitting opinion testimony be-
cause it is relevant to an issue in the case without regard for the
reliability of the underlying scientific principles is rather precarious.
This is evident in State v. Clark,228 a case in which the Montana
Supreme Court addressed the issue of opinion testimony in relation
to the "helpfulness" rule as set forth in Rule 702 of the Montana
Rules of Evidence.229 The court concluded that the foundation re-
quirement for expert testimony had been liberalized by Rule 702,
thus permitting the admission of HGN evidence. 230 In fact, the
court held:
[u]nless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of the partic-
ular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury,
the better approach is to admit all relevant scientific evidence in the
same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be at-
tacked by cross-examination or refutation.231
This reasoning is misguided, as the court's sole criteria for admissi-
223 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 506 N.E.2d 285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (HGN is objective in
nature and thus relevant to the defendant's physical condition).
225 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
227 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
228 762 P.2d 853 (Mont. 1988).
229 Id. Rule 702 of the Montana Rules of Evidence is linguistically identical to Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
230 State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Kan. 1992) (discussing Clark, 762 P.2d at
853).
231 Id. at 856.
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bility of scientific evidence is whether the evidence is relevant to the
case. 23 2 Such logic creates the opportunity for one person's simplis-
tic and plain language theory to be admitted into evidence even
though it may be unreliable and faulty. 233
Regardless of whether the Frye test or relevancy test is followed,
allowing officers to offer opinion testimony about their observations
of the HGN test at this stage is inappropriate. In a trial, often only
the prosecution will call an expert witness. 234 If the witness is the
arresting police officer, not only does this witness have a strong bias
towards conviction, but his testimony will predictably advocate the
reliability of the HGN test without discussing its inadequacies. 235
An unsophisticated jury would accept the results as intoxication
without further explanation. 23 6
Moreover, it is the defense attorney's job to raise doubts about
the reliability of a technique. Although a good defense attorney
should be properly prepared to call his own expert or to at least
thoroughly research the HGN test, it is possible that the attorney
may not know about the inaccuracies of the HGN test, thereby fail-
ing to make an effective cross-examination. Especially if the tech-
nique is novel, it is not unreasonable that a defendant's attorney
may be unaware of existing critical literature. Thus, the costs to a
first time offender under such liberal standards outweigh the bene-
fits of such a standard.
C. STAGE FIVE: TECHNIQUE TESTED TO DEMONSTRATE A POSITIVE
CORRELATION BETWEEN RESULTS AND UNDERLYING THEORY
Whereas courts who focus on issues at stage four are lenient in
admitting opinion testimony, stage five seems to tighten admissibil-
ity requirements. In this stage, an expert witness must understand
the connection between alcohol and the observed eye responses.
232 The relevancy test allows admission of scientific evidence that can materially affect
a case by making the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. FED. R. EvID. 401. Further, Rule 403 merely
qualifies relevancy insofar as the evidence or testimony cannot be prejudicial or confus-
ing. Specifically, Rule 403 states that "all relevant evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
233 See, e.g., Huber, supra note 144, at 742-48 (arguing that expert witnesses must be
limited in their ability to "engage in purely personal, idiosyncratic speculation").
234 MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 90, at § 1.03. This pertains to cases in which the
defendant is charged with DUI. It does not address cases in which the defendant is
charged with a more serious crime such as vehicular manslaughter.
235 Moenssens, supra note 195, at 557.
236 State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 857 (Mont. 1988) (Sheehy, J., concurring).
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"Evidence of a test result cannot be characterized as 'scientific' or
qualify as 'technical or other specialized knowledge,' and thus [be
admissible], unless and until it is established that the test result
demonstrates what it is claimed to demonstrate. ' 23 7
This requirement has the effect of limiting testimony to only
those experts who profess to have a background in either science or
medicine.238 For example, an Oregon Appellate Court held that an
officer was not qualified to testify as an expert when he knew noth-
ing of the bio-physiological basis of the test and did not know
whether alcohol was the only cause of the eye-jerking.239 It appears
that this policy would serve to exclude a lot of worthy evidence be-
cause, even though an officer could be an expert in administering
the test, he may not be able to meet the criteria to comment on the
reliability of its relationship to alcohol. 240
D. STAGE SIX: TECHNIQUE GENERALLY ACCEPTED AFTER SHOWING
TEST YIELDS RELIABLE RESULTS RELATING TO DISPUTED
ISSUE
Finally, stage six assumes that the technique will be admissible
under Daubert or under Frye in states which continue to follow that
rule. In this stage, the HGN test is distinguished from the other
field-sobriety tests in that its legitimacy is established through sci-
ence, rather than common knowledge. 24 ' Daubert is satisfied if the
trial judge determines that the evidence is scientific in nature and
that a relevant connection exists between the testimony and the per-
tinent inquiry. 242 In Frye jurisdictions, the evidence is admissible as
long as a proper foundation is established. To demonstrate a
proper foundation, an officer must show that he is trained in the
particular procedure, that he is certified in the administration of the
procedure, and that the procedure was properly administered. 243
237 State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986).
238 Id.; State v. Reed, 732 P.2d 66, 69 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
239 Reed, 732 P.2d at 69.
240 Id. See also People v. Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
241 State v. Superior Court ev rel. County of Cochise (Blake), 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz.
1986); State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1991).
242 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
243 Buening v. Illinois, 592 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). See, e.g., Desselle
v. State, 596 So. 2d 602 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Brunson v. State, 580 So. 2d 62 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991); Malone v. City of Silverhill, 575 So. 2d 101 (Ala. Crim. App.), rev'd,
575 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1990) (erroneous to admit HGN test results without laying proper
foundation); State ex rel. Hamilton v. City Court of Mesa, 799 P.2d 855 (Ariz. 1990);
State ex rel. McDougall v. Albrecht, 811 P.2d 791 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Brown v. State,
827 S.W.2d 174 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Ojeda, 275 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990); Borden v. Voshell, No. Civ. A 91A-04-001, 1992 WL 51868 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar.
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These requirements are faulty in one respect: the level of com-
petency among the officers who administer the test is wide-ranging.
The NHTSA manual defines the "well-trained technician" as an in-
dividual who studies and properly adheres to the NHTSA manu-
als.244 In all probability, not every officer would meet this standard.
Therefore, this comment suggests that certification for administer-
ing the HGN test should not only guarantee that the officer will
know how to administer the test and know what to look for, but that
the officer will know that there are many other causes of HGN other
than alcohol. 245 The officer then could at least make a simple con-
nection between alcohol and the effects on eye movement. 246 With
such knowledge, the officer could be required to question a suspect
about his or her medical condition before administering the HGN
test. The officer could carry a check-off card with relevant informa-
tion to remember the requisite steps. Such an approach would be
inexpensive and easy to implement.
2 47
Ensuring that a police officer is properly qualified, however,
does not necessarily eliminate all the difficulties that prosecutors
face with this type of evidence. As there is no intuitive relationship
between intoxication and eye "jerking," 248 reliability of the HGN
test must be illustrated through testimony of expert witnesses and
relevant articles and scholarly publications. 249 Prosecutors must be
able to present this evidence in such a way that the trier of fact may




The policy championed in stage six is the best proposal used
thus far because it acknowledges the strengths and weaknesses of
the HGN test and attempts to balance those factors. As previously
stated, evidence admissible at stage six will meet the Frye standard
11, 1992); State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1990); State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110
(Kan. 1992); State v. Garris, 603 So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Armstrong, 561
So. 2d 883, 887 (La. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Erickson, 549 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. 1989).
244 See, e.g., NHTSA DOT HS-806-512, supra note 8, at 1.
245 See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
246 See Rouleau, supra note 14, at 469-89.
247 The West Virginia Supreme Court articulated another interesting proposal-re-
quiring in camera disclosure of methodology, scientific reliability, results of the HGN test,
and evidence of whether procedures were followed by qualified personnel. State v.
Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 678 (W. Va. 1981) (quoted in State v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642,
646 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1988)).
248 See Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
249 See Barker, 366 S.E.2d at 646. See also Clauseu, 270 S.E.2d at 678.
250 State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986).
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for admissibility. Also, under Daubert's interpretation of Rule 702,
scientific evidence is likewise admissible. In fact, as Rule 702 advo-
cates a more liberal standard of admissibility, courts would have the
opportunity to admit HGN testimony at the optimal point on the
continuum of the six stage process for admitting scientific evidence.
It is between stages five and six that a methodology has been
tested to demonstrate its reliability and underlying scientific validity,
but need not have satisfied all the foundational requirements as set
forth in State v. Superior Court.25 1 In adhering to Frye, that case deter-
mined which professional fields constituted the relevant scientific
community and which of its propositions regarding the HGN test
had gained general acceptance within that circle. 252 If state courts
are persuaded by the logic in Daubert, they may continue to rely on
State v. Superior Court, but may do so in a more relaxed manner.
According to Daubert, the trial judge is the gatekeeper who must
ascertain whether testimony is, indeed, scientific knowledge. There
is no need for a consensus among experts. Agreement among a few
specialists may be sufficient to show that the HGN test is reliable.
The judge alone determines what criteria will be used to make such
an assessment. Therefore, it is likely that testimony about the HGN
test will be more readily admitted under a "helpfulness" test than
under Frye.
Yet, as the HGN test is extremely subjective, even a legal stan-
dard aimed at regulating the admittance of scientific evidence may
not be enough to contain the HGN test's "aura of infallibility." Ac-
cordingly, this comment suggests that the results of the HGN test
should not comprise the main evidence presented against a defend-
ant. As the officers have a strong bias towards conviction, they are
quite convincing witnesses. 253 Juries are easily persuaded by them,
and defense attorneys may not have enough knowledge about HGN
to properly attack the test. With the psychophysical tests, the sub-
ject often knows when he is failing a test because he can see himself
fall down, or hear himself miscount numbers or slur words. With
the HGN test, a suspect cannot see his own eyes jerk or twitch.
There is no way to repeat the test, much less obtain a second opin-
ion by the suspect's own expert. Therefore, judges should also pro-
vide warnings to jurors, in the form of jury instructions, about
relying solely on HGN tests to find a person guilty of driving under
the influence of alcohol.
251 State v. Superior Court ff rel. the County of Cochise (Blake), 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz.
1986).
252 Id. at 180; see also notes 185-86 and accompanying text.




Ideally, the final stage that a technique should achieve is that of
judicial notice2 54 of its underlying fact.25 5 In this case, the adjudica-
tive fact is that a forty-five degree angle on onset of HGN indicates
that a person has a BAC of 0.10%. If this fact were to be generally
received by the relevant scientific community, the validity of the
principle could then be assumed in subsequent litigation. 256 This
means that the parties would not have to spend time explaining how
alcohol affects eye movement and how studies concluded that a
forty-five degree angle indicates the possibility of a BAC level of
0. 10%. The fact could simply be stated and the case could progress
without delay. In criminal cases, however, judicial notice is analo-
gous to a presumption; a fact cannot be judicially noticed that does
not leave the jury "free not to find the presumed fact even though
the basic fact is established beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 257 With
courts presently unable to adequately deal with HGN, and the
amount of literature criticizing the correlation between HGN and
BAC, judicial notice for this fact is unlikely anytime soon.
This comment advocates the admittance of HGN evidence in
the courtroom, provided that the jury be expressly cautioned about
the test. This comment proposes a jury instruction that not only
reflects the best aspects of the HGN test, but also mentions the
test's limits, difficulties, and circumstances for unreliability. This in-
struction would enable both parties to put forth their most persua-
sive cases and allow the court to remind the trier of fact that the
evidence is by no means irrefutable.
This jury instruction must possess two key qualities. First, the
court should not reveal its own conclusions on the weight on the
evidence. 258 It should remind the jury that there are several points
to consider without indicating to the jury which inferences it should
draw from the evidence. 259 Second, the jury instruction should re-
semble an instruction for expert testimony. Since a police officer
will probably hold himself out as an expert, and the jury will regard
254 Ajudicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute, such that it
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
255 Dispensing of formal proof when a matter is not really in dispute saves time, en-
ergy and money. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 144, at 4.02.
256 GRAHAM, supra note 194, at § 703.2; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 144, at
402.
257 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 144, at 4.07. See also supra note 193.
258 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 144, at 2.07[02].
259 Id.
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him as such, the instruction should inform the jury that it need not
accept the expert's opinion.260
The proposed sample jury instruction would read as follows:
You have heard testimony from a person described as an expert
witness. An expert witness has, through education, experience, skill or
training gained special knowledge or experience that enable the ex-
pert to state an opinion on matters in that field.
The expert has provided testimony on a roadside sobriety test
called the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test or HGN test. This is sci-
entific evidence and therefore the State has the burden of providing
you with certain information about the HGN test and the expert who
testified about it.
You do not have to accept the expert's opinion. You may accept it
or reject it or give it as much weight as you think it deserves. In doing
so, you should consider the witness' experience and training and the
witness' qualifications as an expert in knowing about the HGN test and
administering the test. You should also consider whether the proce-
dure was properly administered.
Remember that you may consider the soundness of the reasons
given for the opinion, the acceptability of the methods used, and all
other evidence in the case. You alone decide how much of the witness'
testimony is to be believed, and how much weight it deserves.
VII. CONCLUSION
Horizontal gaze nystagmus should be admitted in courts as sci-
entific evidence. Although vulnerable to criticism, most notably that
there are several other causes of nystagmus, the HGN test is thus
far the most effective roadside procedure for determining whether a
person is driving under the influence of alcohol. When the HGN
test is administered in conjunction with the walk-and-turn test, a po-
lice officer can accurately classify a person as having a BAC of
0.10% 80 to 83 times out of 100. Although these tests are not con-
clusive, they can add immeasurable weight to a case based upon a
chemical test.
The HGN test should only be admitted as evidence pursuant to
the guidelines set forth in Daubert or Frye. Since HGN is scientific in
nature, it conveys the "imprimatur of science," and people will
often readily accept its conclusions as accurate. By refusing to ad-
mit pure opinion testimony and requiring that witnesses not only be
properly trained in administering and reading the results of the
HGN test, but also be capable of testifying that, indeed, the test was
260 See PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, U.S. 6TH CIRCUIT DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION
(1991); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 9TH CIRCUIT (1992);
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 8TH
CIRCUIT (1992).
1993] 237
238 STEPHANIE E BUSLOFF [Vol. 84
accurate, the validity and/or reliability of the technique can be prop-
erly confirmed.
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